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ESSAY
PROFESSIONALISM, GENDER AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE ADVOCACY OF
PROTECTION
MINNA J. KOTKrN

I. INTRODUCTION
When lawyers, particularly adversaries, begin to talk about professionalism around me, I sometimes still get anxious, even after more
than twenty years of practice and teaching. My reaction has nothing to
do with doubts about my ethical behavior but, rather, it relates to my
gender: I wonder whether others think I am acting like a woman instead of like a lawyer.
Indeed, the term "professionalism," as used in the legal community today, is not a gender neutral concept. When lawyers of both genders think about professionalism, they contemplate an aspirational vision: those lawyers who abide by the highest ethical standards, represent their client zealously, but with good judgment and good manners.
This idealized "professional" looks beyond the profit motive and contributes to the greater good through public service, thereby finding true
satisfaction in his or her chosen field.' The discourse about professionalism largely focuses on the line between appropriate zeal and bad
manners.
But even a cursory look at the "professionalism" literature reveals
gendered meanings in a surprisingly explicit fashion. The seemingly
gender neutral vision of the professional is, in fact, a vision of a man.
Anthony Kronman's recent influential book, The Lost Lawyer: Failing
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1972, Bamard College; J.D. 1975,
Rutgers University. This essay is an expanded version of a presentation given as part of a
program entitled "Inclusive and Exclusive Visions of Professionalism" at the Annual Meeting of
the Law & Society Association on June 2, 1995. 1 thank Peter Margulies for organizing that
program and for his comments. Thanks also to Stephen Ellmann for giving me the opportunity
to present this piece at New York Lav School's Clinical Theory Workshop, and to all of the
participants who offered valuable thoughts. I acknowledge the generous assistance of Brooklyn
Law School's Summer Research Stipend Program in the completion of this essay.
I. See, e.g., ABA Commission on Professionalism, " . . . In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) [hereinafter
Commission on Professionalism]. The ABA Commission embraced Dean Roscoe Pound's definition of professionalism as: the pursuit of a "learned art . . . in the spirit of public service."
Id. at 261.

ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

Ideals of the Legal Profession, is one example.' Kronman argues for a
return to the days of the "lawyer-statesman," whose representation of a
client is always tempered by sound judgment and strength of character,
and who is a participant in a "political fraternity" of shared values.3
Thomas Shaffer, another well known scholar in the field, harkens back
to the time of the "gentleman lawyer" in tracing the decline of professionalism in the practice of law.4 These gendered portrayals of the
professional ideal, not coincidentally, use as their reference point an era
preceding the influx of women into the legal world.' Perhaps, and
again not by coincidence, the call for greater professionalism in the
practice of law has coincided with a greater inclusion of women6 and
people of color in the profession.7
While women lawyers may voice the same concerns about the
changing nature of the practice of law, many also view the concept of
"professionalism" in a context that implicates gender roles. In the past
ten years, a number of empirical studies have demonstrated that when
women lawyers and law students talk about professionalism, the conversation is often personal. The question, "Am I acting professionally?," rarely relates to ethical norms or standards of civil behavior.
Instead, the question translates into whether a woman feels she is acting in accordance with the role of the advocate, as conceived by men.
Thus, the question becomes, "Am I too emotionally involved with my
client, or not involved enough because I think that involvement is unprofessional; am I too aggressive or not aggressive enough; how can I
match myself to the professional norm, and why does that norm often

2.

ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-

SION (1993).
3. Id. at 20-21, 106-07.
4. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in Professional Ethics, 10 QUEENS L.J. 1 (1984);
see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professional as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV.
393 (1990-1991). Commenting on the ABA Commission on Professionalism, Shaffer notes that
he suspects that its members "yearn for the return of the gentlemen-lawyer," but cannot admit
to it, one reason being that nearly half of the profession is female and "speaking of women as
gentlemen is problematic." He also suggests that it is "problematic to use that word for men
who are not white Protestants." Id. at 400.
5. As the authors of the Report of the Commission on Professionalism pointed out, "Perhaps the golden age of professionalism has always been a few years before the time that the
living can remember. Legend tends to seem clearer than reality.' Commission on Professionalism, supra note 1, at 304.
6. CYNTHIA F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 4 (2d ed. 1993).
7. See Vincent R. Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359, 360-61 n.4 (1990)
(women and minorities comprise increasingly larger percentages of law school graduates); Henry
Ramsey, Jr., Affirmative Action at American Bar Association Approved Law Schools: 19791980, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377, 379-80 (1979-1980).
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feel wrong?"
Starting from the proposition that the personal is the political,
feminist legal theorists have explored this question of role conflict.
Many, particularly those influenced by Carol Gilligan's work,' have
concluded that a rights-based jurisprudence and rights-based, adversarial
process leaves little room for the expression of the distinctively female
values of care and connection. Because "law is male," women in the
profession face an inherent role conflict. 9 While "relational" feminist
theory has been widely criticized as essentialist and culturally determined,"0 it nevertheless seems to ring true for many women lawyers.
Feminist scholars have explored the transformative potential of
viewing the law from a relational perspective.. In virtually every substantive area, there have been efforts to envision how a doctrine that
values an "ethic of care" would look different. The adversarial norm
has also been questioned as the optimal method for dispute resolution.
Transformation of the law is an ambitious and long-term agenda. Much
of the current feminist scholarship offers hope, but not guidance, for
women lawyers confronting an untransformed legal world.
In this Essay, I consider the interaction between relational feminist
theory and women lawyers' concepts of professionalism, and I attempt
to explore how relational values can be used in a legal world that still
defines professionalism in an adversarial, rights-based context. Part II
examines some of the empirical work on women in the profession that
documents problems of role conflict. Part III looks at the theoretical
foundation of that conflict. Part IV offers some personal observations
on generational differences in women lawyers' experiences with role
conflict that have led me to consider the impact of feminist theory on
women's self-perception. Part V considers some views of professionalism that attempt to integrate an ethic of care. Finally, Part VI poses an
alternative formulation of relational feminist theory that may help to
address issues of role conflict. I suggest that an ethic of care does not
require women to reject powerful and forceful advocacy. Rather, it can
be seen as providing a different motivational source for that advocacy.

8. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
9. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988); see generally Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. I
(1988).
10. Catharine MacKinnon is a leading proponent of the view that the "women's voice" is
simply the voice of any powerless and oppressed group, and that it is an adaptation to male
domination. See, e.g., Lecture, Feminist Discourse. Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation,
34 BUFF. L. REV. II, 27 (1985) [hereinafter Feminist Discourse] (remarks of Catharine
MacKinnon).
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Feminist theory can offer the foundation for an "advocacy of protection" that integrates care-based concerns with established professional
norms. By exploring this alternate motivational source, I propose that
we can find a professional role that feels like a true fit and alleviates
the sense of role conflict that characterizes the lives of many women
lawyers.
II.

DEFINING THE ISSUE

The influx of women into the legal profession, beginning in the
1970's," was heralded as a triumph of feminism's second wave. Almost as soon as our presence was felt in larger numbers, we became
the' subject of research.. It became apparent that there was something
not quite right with the "fit" between women and traditional legal education and practice. Indeed, the issue of "fit" has been explored empirically, anecdotally and theoretically in many studies that document how
women and men have distinct experiences with legal institutions. These
works help frame the issue of why concepts of professionalism have a
different meaning for women.
There is substantial evidence that women choose to attend law
school out of motivations more connected to public interest norms-the
desire to "serve society" and contribute to the public good. 2 Assuming that women may begin with a vision of the profession somewhat
different from their male counterparts, there is even more evidence
suggesting that they experience law school differently and in ways that
contribute to alienation from the normative professional model. A recent empirical study of women at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School (Penn Study) 3 concludes that women's academic performance
is below equally qualified male students. The study found that women
feel alienated by both the traditional teaching methodology, and the
informal intellectual life of the law school community. 4 It also ap-

II. See EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 4 (information in Table 1.1 shows that between 1970
and 1980, the proportion of women in the legal profession grew from 4.7% to 12%).
12. See Janet Taber et al., Project, Gender. Legal Education and the Legal Profession: An
Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1219, 123841 (1988) [hereinafter Empirical Study of Stanford] (citing various studies); see also Georgina
W. LaRussa, Portia's Decision: Women's Motives for Studying Law and Their Later Career
Satisfaction as Attorneys, 1 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 350, 353-58 (1977); Suzanne Homer & Lois
Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 28 (1990).
13. Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994).
14. Id.at 3, 21-32. As a result, women garner fewer of the most prestigious jobs. Similar
results have been reported at Yale, where in 1991, seven times as many men as women accepted federal appellate court clerkships, even though women represented 40% of the graduating
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pears that women shed their desire to pursue public interest careers
during their law school tenures and come to more closely mimic the
aspirations of male classmates. 5
The Penn Study, as well as an earlier anecdotal report of
women's experiences at Yale Law School, 6 is replete with reports of
conflict about women's professional roles. Women widely report that
they feel a powerful pressure to conform to a professional model of
dispassionate and objective advocacy, in a competitive milieu that values quick and assertive speech. Some women view the environment as
just barely concealing an hostility towards women in general. Women
see the law school experience as training them to be less emotional, to
suppress feelings and to "put away" passionately held beliefs. 7 Aggressive and abrasive classroom behavior is met with approbation and it
has been widely documented that women participate less than men. 8
The Penn Study refers to women who conform to the norm as feeling
that they have submerged their former selves in the pursuit of succeeding as a "social male."' 9
Studies of female graduates reflect similar patterns of conflict over
dispassionate aggressive advocacy. An article based on an empirical
survey by Stacy Caplow and Shira Scheindlin reports that a majority of
women feel that their gender has hampered their success.2" One of the
class. Saundra Torry, At Yale Law, A Gender Gap in Who Gets Clerkships Sparks Debate,
WASH. POST, May 13, 1991, at F5.
15. Guinier, supra note 13, at 40-41. It appears that, as a general matter, law students'
desires to practice public interest law significantly decrease over three years. See E. Gordon
Gee & Donald W. Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 4
B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 957-59 (1977). Robert Stover explains that the decline is, in part, the
result of students' lack of exposure to public interest law, and a concomitant immersion in
business practice. He suggests that law schools need to nurture a public interest subculture by:
supporting student groups; faculty members setting an example through a commitment to pro
bono work; providing law students with various opportunities to experience public interest practice; emphasizing, in ethics courses, pro bono obligations; integrating concers, in classroom
discussions, for the unrepresented. ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE
FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL 117-20 (Howard S. Erlanger
ed., 1989).
16. Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, Essay, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1988).
17. Guinier, supra note 13, at 49.
18. See, e.g., Taunya L. Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137,
141 (1988); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Classroom Climate: Encouraging Student Involvement,
4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 326, 326 n.3 (1989-1990); Empirical Study of Stanford, supra note
12, at 1239.
19. Guinier, supra note 13, at 43. Lucinda Finley has commented that some women law
students describe their experience as being forced to become "bilingual," fearing the loss of
their native tongue. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence In Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886, 894 n.39 (1989).
20. Stacy Caplow & Shira A. Scheindlin, "Portrait of a Lady": The Woman Lawyer In
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most repeated comments of respondents to the study was that the practice of law is unpleasant because it is characterized by conflict and
confrontation. 2' Caplow and Scheindlin found that women practitioners
are dissatisfied with adversarial methods of resolving disputes, and prefer problem-solving and conciliatory modes of resolution rather than
methods based upon aggressive posturing.2 Their study indicates that
many women, close to a majority, are more dissatisfied than men with
law practice. Other such findings have been widely reported,23 as has
evidence that women generally express a greater interest than men in
leaving the profession. 4
In one of the most extensive empirical efforts, Rand Jack and
Dana Jack (a lawyer/psychologist team) explored the field of moral
conflict for women in law practice, posing the question, "What is happening to the growing number of women entering a system designed
by and for men?" 5 Their interviews document a continuing sacrifice
of personal morality that begins with the law school experience. 6 As
a result they find that women experience great disharmony with regard
to their professional roles. They trace the root of the conflict to
women's care-oriented perspective that continually conflicts with a
rights-based legal system. Jack and Jack also note that when the gap
between personal morality and professional role widens, so does tension. Describing the "double bind" women experience, they write:
Yet for a woman to play the law game as a man does violates sex
role norms, a transgression that is negatively judged by others and
that can create anxiety in the transgressor. To fit the stereotypical
image of an advocate means being argumentative and aggressive,
characteristics that are traditionally condemned in women. If a
woman chooses to reject the usual lawyer image . . . she may be
labeled too feminine, and others may doubt her fiber as a tough

the 1980s, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 391, 428 (1990).
21. Id.at 422. The authors note that women "faulted themselves . . . for being insufficiently aggressive instead of questioning the operative professional values." Id. at 422-23.
22. Id.
23. See ABA COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., OPTIONS AND OBSTACLES: A SURVEY OF
THE STUDIES OF THE CAREERS OF WOMEN LAWYERS 26-28 (1994); see also The State of the
Legal Profession, 1990 ABA SEC. YOUNG LAW. REP. 8 (discussing the extent, causes and
impact of lawyer career dissatisfaction).
24. See Raquel A. Hunter, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 125 & n.44 (1993) (reviewing
DEBORAH L. ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW: WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE GETTING Our OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1989)); see also Cheryl Frank, Leaving the Law: Are Reasons Gender
Based?, ABA J., Dec. 1985, at 34.
25. RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE
CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS at xi (1989).
26. Id. at 45.
27. Id. at 126.
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lawyer."
Jack and Jack conclude with the hope that care-oriented perspectives
can be better integrated into a right-based legal system, suggesting that
"both care and rights speak to a quality of justice," with each checking
the faults of excess in the other.29
The inherent role conflict that many women experience is exacerbated by legal institutions that still permit the derogation of women in
the profession. These experiences have been catalogued at length in the
various recent studies exploring gender bias in the courts.3" In essence,
these studies suggest that the courts, as primary legal institutions, have
contributed substantially to women lawyers' sense of exclusion from
the norms of professionalism. The studies detail the indignities that
women face in the courts, both as litigants and as advocates. A Ninth
Circuit study, for example, reported that women lawyers experience the
federal courts as a "club" that welcomes only men.3 The New York
Task Force reported that beyond the more obvious examples of demeaning remarks, a more subtle form of discrimination undermines
women in the profession: while aggressive behavior is rewarded or
tolerated from men attorneys, it is viewed by the judiciary as out of
place or unacceptable from women.32 Statistical data bear out these
perceptions, particularly in the number of women represented at various
levels of the judicial hierarchy. 3
Many of these works share common conceptions of possible remedial measures, ranging from pragmatic to transformative. The Penn
Study authors call for a restructuring of legal education to modify the
adversarial approach to problem solving represented by the Socratic
method, which values the argumentative professor-student interaction.34

28. Id. at 134.
29. Id. at 170-71.
30. See. e.g.. Judith Resnik, Gender in the Courts: The Task Force Reports, in THE
WOMAN ADVOCATE: EXCELLING IN THE 90'S 10-11 (Jean M. Snyder & Andra B. Greene eds.,
1995).
31. The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 784 (1994).
32. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
11, 145 (1986-1987) [hereinafter N.Y Task Force].
33. Resnik, supra note 30, at I1;Marilyn J. Berger & Kari A. Robinson, Women's Ghetto
in the Legal Profession, 8 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 71, 89-92 (1992-1993); N.Y Task Force, supra
note 32, at 150-53 (noting nearly half of all women judges sit in New York's family, criminal,
housing and civil courts).
34. Guinier, supra note 13, at 93, 95. In fact, criticism of the Socratic method is a staple
of feminist writing about legal education. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal
Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38
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Jack and Jack concur and further advocate for the inclusion of a
communitarian care-based approach to legal issues, with a recognition
of the importance of personal morality.35 The absence of women in
positions of authority, such as professors and judges, in proportion to
the number of women entering the legal profession36 may be viewed
as contributing to women's sense of alienation. In the practice of law
itself, many have suggested that more attention should be given to
forms of alternate dispute resolution that value a non-adversarial mode
of interaction.
III. THE ISSUE DEFINED THEORETICALLY
The empirical body of work studying women in the profession
certainly appears to mirror the school of feminist psychological theory
popularized by Carol Gilligan. Indeed, Gilligan's influence on both
empirical and theoretical legal scholarship is widely acknowledged as
enormously significant.3 7 Her work has been used to explain much of
the empirical evidence discussed above.
Gilligan's thesis is that women demonstrate a different moral
focus than men.38 Women reject a morality based on concepts of
rights and individual justice. Instead, they employ an ethic of care in
their moral reasoning, looking to concerns of responsibility and community. Thus, women and men approach the resolution of conflict from
different perspectives: men favor the application of neutral rules, while
women look for solutions that are more contextual and attempt to
maintain relationships and connection.39
To explain this difference in moral development, Gilligan draws
on the school of feminist psychological theory represented by the

J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 77 (1988); Morrison Torrey et al., Teaching Law in a Feminist Manner:
A Commentary From Experience, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 87, 90-91 (1990).
Others have called for course offerings, emphasizing women's voices in literature, to
help stem women's sense of alienation in law school. See, e.g., Melissa Harrison, A Time of
"Passionate Learning": Using Feminism, Law, and Literature to Create a Learning Community
60 TENN. L. REv. 393 (1993); see also Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law,
Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990).
35. JACK & JACK, supra note 25, at 156-71.
36. Guinier, supra note 13, at 77.
37. GILLIGAN, supra note 8; see generally Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REV. 797, 797-80 (1989) (noting Gilligan's influence on feminist scholarship).
38. GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at I.
39. Id. at 10-11; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 34, at 73.
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works of Nancy Chodorow40 and Jean Baker Miller.4 These authors
posit that men's need to separate from their mothers in order to
achieve their gender identity creates the foundation for valuing autonomous rights-based thinking. Women, on the other hand, create their
gender identity by maintaining attachment to their mothers, and therefore relational values come to dominate their moral viewpoint. Neofreudian notions of male competitiveness and aggressiveness are linked
to differences in the creation of the gender role.
Although Gilligan's work has been widely criticized,42 it has
been even more widely embraced in the realm of feminist legal scholarship.43 Certainly, its essentialism is apparent: not all men and not all
women replicate these models of moral reasoning. While this disclaimer
is a standard feature of both Gilligan's writing44 and those that rely on
her thesis, it usually gets lost in any ensuing analysis. Issues of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other cultural and societal differences may
be at least determinative of moral perspective. Moreover, Catharine
MacKinnon and others raise the persuasive argument that these gender
differences are not immutable characteristics, but stem from societal
construction of gender or more directly from our cultural history of the
subordination of women.45 Post-modem feminist legal theoreticians
reject both the dominance and the relational schools as creating rigid
and false dichotomies based on dominant gender stereotypes.46
Nevertheless, the critiques of Gilliganism cannot detract from its
influence. Not only has "relational feminism" served as the foundation
for a substantial rethinking of legal doctrine and lawyering theory, but
it has, for better or worse, permeated the consciousness of the legal
academy. Indeed, the relationship between the empirical studies of
women in law school and in the profession and Gilliganism has been
made quite explicit. All of the studies, to greater or lesser degrees,
attribute women's role conflicts to the legal education's failure to value
noncompetitive learning styles and to its exclusive emphasis on "neu-

40. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
41. See JEAN B. MILLER, TOWARDS A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (2d ed. 1986).
42. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
43. For a discussion of Gilligan's influence, see Williams, supra note 37, at 803 n.17.
44. See GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 2.
45. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 38-39 (1987); see also Feminist
Discourse, supra note 10, at 23-28.
46. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction in the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and
the Logic of imagination, 70 TEx. L. REV. 109, 112-16 (1991).
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tral," rights-based analysis.
IV. A PERSONAL DIGRESSION
I went to law school in the early 1970's and thus preceded the
reign of relational feminism. We, the fifteen women in my law school
class, were very much part of the equality generation. We were following closely on the heels of the rebirth of feminism in the contemporary
women's movement, and it was our involvement in the struggle for
equal rights that led most of us to law school in the first place. We
believed, naively as it turns out, that a formal abstract standard of
equal treatment was all that was required to remedy what we called
"sex discrimination." We viewed law school as a means for learning
the tools to wage that campaign. Even those of us without an explicit
public interest focus envisioned a future of breaking down the barriers
against women in the traditional bar and taking our rightful place
among the leaders of the profession.
I do not recall our feeling silenced in the classroom, despite an all
male faculty relying exclusively on the Socratic method. In fact, the
few women in a class usually made their presence felt quite vocally.
We felt the absence of role models and mentors, but we supported one
another in what we conceived of a group effort to integrate ourselves
into the legal world. We were rewarded by our academic performance
which, as a group, seemed to outpace that of the men.47 Looking
back, it seems that we embraced wholeheartedly a rights-based jurisprudence and suffered little over issues of role conflict stemming from an
ethic of care and connection. Clearly, these are completely subjective
impressions, but in talking to women colleagues of my generation, I've
found that their law school experiences were not dissimilar to mine."
As a teacher today, however, I do not doubt for a moment that
my women students experience law school as described in the empirical
work and that those graduating in the last ten years struggle over questions of professional role as related to gender. My personal experience

47. In their survey of 1975 and 1976 women graduates, Caplow and Scheindlin found that
their respondents typically performed well in law school: "Over 51% reported graduating in the
top quarter of their class; 21% in the top 10%." See Caplow & Scheindlin, supra note 20, at
403. The University of Pennsylvania study reports similar findings. See Guinier, supra note 13,
at 13 n.40.
48. However, women's accounts of the law school experience from a slightly earlier period
paint a different picture. See, e.g., Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like
To Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L.
REV. 799, 811-12 (1988).
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confirms that most women, and even some men, have a difficult time
adapting to the dominant professional norms, even discounting for issues of family and work that continue to fall more heavily on the
shoulders of women.
What accounts for the difference? There are some rather obvious
hypotheses. First, it may be that women who chose law school in the
pioneering times of the "second wave" were a self-selecting group.
Perhaps we were already "social males," and therefore pursued legal
careers with a minimum of conflict. Perhaps our grounding in the
equality feminism49 that pervaded those years made us believe that
once in the law school door the rest was easy; on a level playing field
we would succeed. Another theory, of course, is that we were victims
of "false consciousness": we could not even perceive or take in the
oppressiveness of the law school environment." It may have just been
that times were different, however, the spirit of social change gave us
the belief that all things, including the eradication of sexism and patriarchal oppression, were possible.
There are some alternative explanations, however, that can translate into suggestions for women in law school today. First, the strength
of the women's community was of inestimable value. Because there are
so many more women in law school now, that sense of community
does not naturally create itself, but it can be fostered and nurtured if
law schools provide the resources and opportunities." Second, our
commitment to law as an instrument of social change was another
source of strength."2 Again, support and encouragement in law schools

49. Equality feminism is concerned with issues of equal access for women to educational,
civic and economic institutions. Martha Minow views equality feminism as the first of three
stages of feminist scholarship. In the second stage, scholars began to focus on acknowledging
and respecting women's differences. She identifies a third stage that rejects this dualistic paradigm. See Martha Minow, Introduction: Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our Beyond, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1989). For other discussions of equality feminism, see Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 199,
199-205 (1989-1990) and Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1279 (1987).
50. See Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1773-76 (1991) (discussing why women fail to perceive or complain about discrimination).
51. Weiss and Melling discuss the importance of their women's group as contributing to a
sense of empowerment and creating a means by which they could become more assertive in
the law school community. Weiss & Melling, supra note 16, at 1309; see also Harrison, supra
note 34, at 394, 412 (discussing at length the sense of community created by a group of
women students participating in an independent study program on feminism, law and literature).
52. Caplow and Scheindlin found that among the women they surveyed, those least likely
to have chosen a different career worked in legal education and public or government agencies.
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for public interest careers may help those women whose motivation to
become lawyers stemmed from this perspective.
V. CHANGING THE PROFESSION: SOME TRANSFORMATIVE
IDEAS
I will not dwell on the doctrinal contributions of relational feminist theory. This presents a body of work that seeks to answer the
question of how the law and legal education would be different if they
addressed concerns of community and connection rather than autonomous rights-based individualism. 3 Such a doctrinal shift might well
create a closer fit for women in the profession, but this scholarship
does little to respond to the everyday concerns of women entering the
law today, other than to provide what is hopefully a vision for the
future.
Other scholarship stemming from relational feminism, that addresses the issue of lawyering role has more immediate relevance to
women's dilemma over professionalism norms. Some of this work
attempts to find a place for the "ethic of care" in a re-conceived view
of the lawyering process. For example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests
that women may alter the structure of dispute resolution by favoring
alternatives to the adversarial model that better responds to the varied
needs of the parties. She writes that the ethic of care "suggests that
women lawyers may be particularly interested in mediation as an alter' Even within
native to litigation as a method of resolving disputes."54
the adversarial model, she notes, women lawyers may more actively
pursue negotiated settlements with greater attention to equitable remedies.
Others scholars drawn to relational feminism have posited a reconception of the attorney-client relationship. Stephen Ellmann, for example, writes about the different moral responsibilities towards clients
that would spring from an ethic of care." Lawyers would permit
themselves to feel sympathetic engagement and a personal attachment
See Caplow & Scheindlin, supra note 20, at 421.
53. See, e.g., Marjorie M. Schultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers,
77 IOWA L. REV. 55 (1991); Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report: "Sex Bias in the Teaching of
Criminal Law," 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 309 (1990); Bender, supra note 9.
54. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women 's Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 53 (1985).

55. See Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665
(1993); see also Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, I CLINICAL L. REV. 65, 69
(1994); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional
Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992).
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to clients.56 Indeed, Ellmann suggests that the acceptance of such connection would not be deemed "unprofessional," but rather would be
viewed as critical to effective and ethical standards of representation."
Another category of scholarship that seems to respond to women's
role conflict relates to questioning ethical responsibilities with regard to
client selection. The traditional view is that we take clients as we find
them and are bound to represent them zealously with few boundaries.
We are not responsible for the resulting impact on the larger community, nor are we to judge the moral or political content of what we espouse on behalf of the client.5 8 William Simon, among others, argues
that legal ethics should acknowledge a contrary responsibility to choose
clients only after we examine and approve their goals, based on our
understanding of community values and interests.59 His "discretionary"
approach to lawyering, while not explicitly grounded in relational feminism, responds in part to the law's failure to value communitarian
concerns that trouble many women. Naomi Cahn takes this analysis a
step further in suggesting that our ethical codes could suggest or require that lawyers disclose to clients potential conflicts between personal morality and professional judgment."
Having used some of these works in my clinical teaching, I know
that many women students are amazed and delighted to discover such a
body of scholarship. More than the empirical studies of women in law
or the doctrinal scholarship, these works challenge the norms of professionalism and suggest alternative conceptions that seem to offer a better
fit for those who privilege care based reasoning.
VI. HELPING WOMEN TODAY
These various incorporations of relational feminist notions into
professionalism norms hold out hope for the possibility of change. I
celebrate them and am inspired by them; however, I recognize also that
they do not fully respond to the dilemma of women in practice today,
just as notions of reforming legal education say little to women in law

56. See Ellmann, supra note 55, at 2693-94.
57. Id. at 2709.
58. David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1004 (1990) (citing DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHIcAL STUDY, 160-61, 169-74 (1988)).
59. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1083-84 (1988).
60. Naomi R. Cahn, A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 23, 49 (1990).
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school today.
Other writers exploring this dilemma have simply rejected the
premises of relational feminism as inconsistent with the concept of
law.6 In her essay, Gilligan's Travels, Joan Shaughnessy concludes
that "women's inclinations for activities of care will necessarily be
frustrated as they encounter the law's limitations. Eventually, women
are likely either to feel alienated from their practice or to learn to
downplay their inclination for caring activities. 6 2 I cannot accept such
a pessimistic assertion, which leaves satisfying professional careers only
to those of us who become "social males." Given the empirical studies,
and my anecdotal experience, we would then be consigning too many
of us, perhaps even a large majority, to the dustbin of the profession.
Moreover, it excludes the possibility of incremental changes in the
norm.
I believe that there are some pragmatic and more immediately
implementable solutions to the dilemma of women lawyers functioning
effectively in an unreconstructed adversarial system. It is my sense that
women who practice public interest law do not feel the same degree of
role conflict. They are forceful advocates within the traditional adversarial system. While they may not relish the fight as much as their
male counterparts, it does not tear them apart because they have the
larger good to sustain them. Nor do women law students who are not
deterred from such career goals have such negative reactions to the law
school environment. If they are able also to connect with a supportive
community, their experience is not so unlike mine in the early 1970's.
Thus, one concrete goal for legal educators is to nurture and encourage
these women and push our institutions to do likewise. Another goal is
to attempt to provide empirical evidence for these impressions. Women
need to be aware of positive professional models. They need to know
about women who are emotionally rewarded by their work. I sometimes have the sense that the spate of recent empirical work, demonstrating how poorly women fit within professional norms, only serves
to breed more dissatisfaction.
On a more theoretical level, it is time to rethink and reconfigure
the foundations of relational feminism, and to examine more closely its
psychological roots. The relationship of women to mothering, and the
creation of gender identity through connection rather than separation,
does not need to be viewed only as creating an ethic of care that es-

61. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 45, at 1738-39.
62. Joan M. Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 23 (1988).
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chews conflict and assertiveness, the staples of our adversarial system.
The psychological construct of women can be reinterpreted to provide
more productive motivational sources for women lawyers. For example,
in discussing the meaning of morality, one woman in Gilligan's study
says, "I think I have a real drive, a real maternal drive, to take care of
someone-to take care of my mother, to take care of children, to take
care of other people's children, to take care of my own children, to
take care of the world."63 I want to focus on that drive and the protectiveness that it engenders in women. It is that drive that creates the
fierceness with which women can defend children or others in need of
care. Just as concerns with connection can work to improve attorneyclient relationships, concerns with protection of clients can provide the
inspiration and motivation for effective adversarial advocacy. Thus, I
suggest we look to begin to explore the concept of an "advocacy of
protection" that can at least rival the male motivational sources of
competition and aggression.
What do I mean by an "advocacy of protection?" Primarily, I
contemplate an advocacy in which the lawyer focuses on an empathetic
understanding of a client's powerlessness in the litigation process and a
deep connection with the client's goals. With this focus in mind, the
lawyer can bring a "care perspective" to bear upon the litigation process, consistent with assertive advocacy. Thus, I suggest that we constantly keep in mind that in the traditional litigation context, lawyers
must speak for clients. Whether plaintiff or defendant, our clients have
little opportunity to tell how they have been wronged or falsely accused. Those occasions that supposedly allow for litigants to tell their
stories, such as depositions and trials, are often stylized performances,
the content of which is dictated by rules of evidence and case strategy,
as much as by the stories our clients want to be heard. Clients frequently have little control over the speed at which their actions progress, the fairness of the procedures, the attitudes of the factfinder.
However much we as lawyers respect the tenets of client-centered
decision-making, our clients nevertheless cede to us tremendous responsibility. They are required by the process to rely on our skills to
achieve their goals. Thus, we are their sole protectors in a system that
often rewards zealous advocacy over truth and justice.
It is my sense that this vision of professional role can help those
lawyers who value care and connection to better negotiate the adversarial process, and to suffer less from the role conflict that empirical

63. GILLIGAN, supra note 8, at 99.

ST. THOMASLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

studies have described. Here I draw on my experience as a clinical
teacher, directing a program in which students represent pro se litigants
in federal court actions, primarily involving claims of employment
discrimination or other civil rights violations. My students who favor
care based reasoning-many women and some men-often excel at
forming empathetic relationships with clients, but feel themselves at a
disadvantage when faced with opposing counsel who view the litigation
process as a game, or worse, as a war. These lawyers show little interest in approaching litigation from a problem solving perspective, or in
exploring creative processes or solutions. Instead, they follow the all
too familiar strategies of engaging in interminable discovery delays and
disputes, taking contentious and acrimonious depositions, and making
ill-founded motions. When students respond assertively, attempting to
match their behavior to this view of the professional norm, they complain of feeling inauthentic, of acting a role with little conviction.
When they do not respond in kind, they feel a sense of failure, of not
representing their client effectively. In either case, these students frequently find their interactions with opposing counsel emotionally stressful and often question whether litigation will be a rewarding career for
them.
In my supervision and counseling of students who face this dilemma, I am sometimes tempted to simply agree that traditional litigation
practice is not an optimal means of resolving disputes, nor does it
necessarily offer a satisfying professional life for those who do not relish conflict, or at least tolerate it well. But if teachers dissuade students
with a care perspective from participating in our legal system's dominant dispute resolution mechanism, we are contributing to the perpetuation of professional norms that disadvantage many women lawyers. If
women choose non-participation, they cannot effect change in the
norms by their increasing presence in the profession, and by rising to
positions of influence, particularly in the judiciary and the academy.
Thus, rather than affirm students' discomfort with the litigation
process, I have attempted to help them focus upon their role as protectors. This perspective is a useful motivator for confronting professional
norms that seem rooted in competition and conflict. The stressful nature
of interactions with opposing counsel can be minimized by constructing
a response to aggressive behavior in light of client goals and a determination to protect clients from abuse at the hands of the litigation
process. Thus, when faced with an adversary who vociferously and
irrationally argues against the production of obviously relevant documents, for example, those who favor care based reasoning can be over-
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whelmed by the frustration and futility of the interchange, and have
difficulty charting a path between escalating conflict and giving up the
battle. But the "protective" advocate concentrates on the importance of
"taking care" of her client to ensure that his goals are not derailed by
such tactics. Through this conception of the lawyer's role, an advocate
has a guidepost against which to measure an appropriate response. If,
for example, the documents are available from another source, the
advocate has not failed if she withdraws from the dispute. If the documents must be obtained from opposing counsel, however, she may be
able to feel less conflict about insistent advocacy, and more authentic
in formulating an assertive response, when viewing her role as a "protector."
VII. CONCLUSION
Feminist theory has begun to change the nature of law and lawyering. However, the recent emphasis on relational feminism as explaining women's alienation from legal education and practice risks
discouraging women from participating in those legal institutions that
are most in need of change. Values of care and connection need not
disadvantage women in the practice of law. They can be incorporated
into an "advocacy of protection" that can help change professional
norms.

